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Abstract. The current trend in space science is for payload developers to minimize program cost and
schedule while conducting useful science. One problem with the design, integration, and testing of lowcost missions is that much of the savings results from the assumption of risk. Analyzing lessons learned
from high-risk programs is an effective means for increasing success while meeting budget and schedule
constraints. University efforts, such as the University Nanosat Program (UNP), are faced with the
seemingly contradictory goals of mission success and low cost while designing revolutionary
experiments. Currently planned for a shuttle launch, UNP is subject to rigorous qualification
requirements resulting from NASA’s manned spaceflight safety program. Universities have limited
experience with the design, integration, and test of flight hardware for manned spaceflight. The program
has identified many areas for improvement. This paper explores the effects of various program and
technical approaches--those that worked, and those that didn’t. Design, integration and test, configuration
management, quality assurance, and safety are considered. Lessons learned from the University Nanosat
Program are expected to be the basis for success in launching future university-built technology.
Test Program (STP), and NASA/GSFC, to explore
this shift in paradigm.

Introduction
A promising way to perform many space missions
is to use clusters of microsatellites that operate
cooperatively to perform the function of a larger,
single satellite. The University Nanosat program
(UNP) is a collaborative effort between the
AFRL/VS, the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research (AFOSR), the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Space

The program consists of multiple nanosatellites
(nanosats) designed and built by US universities
that are baselined to deploy from the Space Shuttle
via the Shuttle Hitchhiker Experiment Launch
System (SHELS). The nanosats are being built
through university team efforts.
Santa Clara
University, Stanford and MIT are building the
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Emerald and Orion spacecraft. Utah State
University, University of Washington, and
Virginia Tech are building three nanosats known
as ION-F, and Arizona State University, New
Mexico State University and the University of
Colorado at Boulder have constructed the Three
Corner Sat (3CS) nanosats. For both flights, the
nanosats are mounted on an AFRL-built
integrating structure known as the Multiple
Satellite Deployment System (MSDS).

payload, and evaluation of university designs.
From this vantage point, AFRL has accumulated a
tremendous amount of experience in working with
universities and students, developing and
integrating multiple small satellites, and
negotiating the NASA manned space flight safety
process. This experience has resulted in a
valuable list of lessons learned which is
documented in this paper, and hopefully can be
used by other programs both in the Shuttle and
expendable launch vehicle environments. These
lessons are summarized in the following sections.

The current UNP flight compliment, dubbed
Nanosat-2, consists of the 3CS hardware mounted
on the MSDS. Integration and test of Nanosat-2 is
completed and the payload is awaiting manifest at
AFRL. The Nanosat-2 payload is scheduled to fly
on the Space Shuttle in late CY 03. A schematic
of the launch scenario is shown in Figure 1, and
the flight hardware is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Nanosat-2 Flight Hardware
Safety Documentation
The greatest challenge to the UNP has been
navigating and implementing the NASA manned
space flight safety process, a procedure being
undertaken for the first time by many program
participants. Aside from hardware design, build,
and test, many lessons learned were generated in
the area of required safety documentation. One
basic issue is to ensure that the universities
understand the quantity of documentation
involved.
This can by done by providing
examples. However two related lessons learned
were generated: efficient preparation of
documents, and avoiding generation of
unnecessary documents.

Figure 1. University Nanosat Program Concept
Throughout the program, AFRL has been
responsible for program management, preparation
of NASA-required documentation including safety
documentation, integration and testing of the

Before discussing lessons learned, a brief
overview of the safety process is warranted. The
safety process comprises three phases of safety
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reviews (Phases 0/1, 2, and 3) conducted by the
JSC Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP). For
each phase, documents must be developed that
analyze the payload for hazards and detail the
means by which safety is verified. Examples of
documents are Flight and Ground Safety Data
Packages that provide a detailed description and
safety analysis of the payload, Structural and
Mechanical Verification Plans, a Fracture Control
Plan, and a detailed materials list. For each
hazardous system identified in the safety analysis,
a hazard report, which identifies hazard causes,
controls, and means of verifying that the controls
are present, must be generated. The verifications
are heavily scrutinized by NASA safety and
eventually become the checklist of actions that
must be satisfied before a payload can fly.
Verifications consist of tests, analysis, inspections,
reports, and procedures, and are first developed by
the payloader as part of their documentation.

provides the connection between payload safety
and design and will be discussed in the next
section “Design Engineering”, as well. The
hazard report verifications define a set of
requirements that is essentially unique to the
payload and can be controlled by the payload
organization. The most obvious way to minimize
these requirements is simply to design a payload
with a minimal number of hazardous systems.
However, for those systems where hazard reports
must be developed, it is possible for an
inexperienced
payload
organization
to
inadvertently burden itself with unnecessary
documentation requirements. In developing
verifications, the payloader must meet safety
requirements, but at the same time generate the
minimum amount of paper required to prove that
the payload is safe.
A good example was the numerous hazard report
verifications which indicated that the program
would prepare “inspection procedures and
inspection reports” for various steps in the
hardware build-up.
These documents were
specified in some cases for installations that were
entered into the build certification logs as standard
practice. All of the steps entered into the build log
were verified and signed off by a second party.
Therefore, in order to establish that the verification
had been met, there was little need for
development of an inspection report and
procedure.
In reviewing the hazard report
verifications, NASA reviewers are more
concerned about safety issues than advising the
payload on how to eliminate documentation.
Another example occurred wherein universities
developed detailed build procedures with sign-out
blocks but also completed detailed certification
logs for the same processes. Therefore, this was a
duplicated effort.

The lessons learned in efficiency focused on
effective transmittal of information from
universities to AFRL. For the UNP, AFRL was
the overall preparer of the documents; however,
the universities contributed the material relevant to
their spacecraft mostly via e-mail. One of the
problems encountered in this process was the
delay caused by the review and comment cycle
between the universities and AFRL. Students had
very little experience with technical writing,
especially related to safety documentation, and
also had a high turnover rate. On the other hand,
as the program progressed, AFRL’s collective
experience with safety documentation increased,
with the same personnel working on all of the
payload elements. Once the Phase 0/1 review took
place for the first flight, a more efficient approach
would have been for the AFRL safety engineer to
do all of the technical writing based on face-toface conversations with university engineers and
visual inspection of the hardware or prototypes.
This would have saved time in review and rewrite
cycles with the students, allowed the AFRL side of
the program to obtain a better familiarity with the
university hardware, and taken the burden off the
universities to provide a safety engineer.

Although these lessons learned apply to
documentation, it is probably obvious that design
and generation of safety documentation are interrelated because of the need to prove that the
payload is safe. Lessons learned related to
documentation are summarized in Table 1. The
second half of the picture, design and engineering,
is discussed in the next section.

Another important lesson focused on control of the
scope of requirements imposed by the verifications
listed in the hazard reports. This is a subject that
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safety panel was uncomfortable with the design
and raised numerous issues including technical
questions, quality assurance issues, and simply
how to categorize the design within the NASA
safety requirements. The program left the review
with action items whose resolution consumed a
large amount of student time.
These efforts
involved redesign of the systems, which required
resolution of the technical issues, developing a
presentation and reconvening with the safety panel
to represent the designs, not to mention several
review cycles with STP, AFRL, and GSFC prior to
the safety review. After the items were finally
resolved, AFRL realized that the resolution of the
action item consumed too many resources for all
parties. AFRL later requested a redesign of
several mechanisms that were questionable based
on the Phase 0/1 review. The redesigns resulted in
greatly simplified mechanisms, elimination of
hazard reports, and a few questions from the safety
panel.

Table 1. Summary of Lessons Learned:
Safety Documentation
Lessons Learned
Recognize
the
quantity
of
required
documentation early. Review examples from
similar programs.
Generate documentation efficiently.
The
technical writer should be in direct contact with
hardware builders, and know the hardware well.
Limit required documentation by minimizing
documentation for hazard report verifications.
Provide only what is necessary to prove safety.
Design Engineering
For shuttle projects, working the issues of design
and safety in parallel will likely result in time and
cost savings. Proving that a design is safe can
result in a tremendous cost in document
development, tests, and, analysis. The key is to
design hardware with the safety requirements in
mind and to come up with a design for which
safety is easy to prove, i.e. the required tests,
analysis, and inspections are within the budget and
capability of the university. In other words, as
discussed in the previous section, the payload must
try to minimize the scope of requirements by
minimizing the hazard report verifications.
Therefore, from the design standpoint, the basic
idea is to design non-hazardous systems with no
hazard reports or to design systems with a minimal
number of verifications that are easy to
accomplish. Lessons learned identify ways in
which this approach can be supported and are
based on the design review process, understanding
how safety problems in design can affect the
program as a whole, and use of common designs.

Successful incorporation of the previous lessons
learned obviously relies on the availability of
experienced reviewers from numerous disciplines
at all levels, such as engineers, technicians, and
management.
Although there are numerous
NASA safety documents, translation of safety
requirements into design implementation is not
obvious sometimes. In addition, there is very little
hardware that is officially “approved” by NASA
because the prevailing philosophy is that each
design is reviewed for safety on a case-by-case
basis. As the UNP program progressed, AFRL
had the advantage of reviewing several nanosat
designs developed by universities, and of going
through the Phase 0/1 safety review. Therefore,
the AFRL reviewers developed skills in evaluating
designs for safety, and recognizing designs that
would likely result in action items or requirements
from the PSRP. The following is a list of several
of these items:

One of the lessons learned early in the UNP
program was the need to eliminate potentially
troublesome designs prior to the Phase 0/1 safety
review.
As an example, the UNP program
presented a mechanism design to the PSRP at the
Phase 0/1 safety review that contained features
that were out of the scope of typical aerospace
practice. Although there was some concern raised
about the designs prior to the review, some of the
features in question were not addressed in the
NASA safety requirements. At the review, the

•

•

When purchasing hardware, especially
components that contain non-metallic
items, obtain a materials list first and
ensure that all materials meet the
outgassing requirements listed on the
NASA Materials websites.
Eliminate mechanisms that rely on friction
as a means of retention. This could mean
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

linear screws, crimps, gears, etc. Ensure
that the only means of inadvertent release
is through failure of a structural, metallic
part. Ensure that the part is easy to
analyze, i.e. the load path in all
environments is clear and that materials
properties are well understood.
Eliminate structural or mechanical
components that are epoxied or glued
together, particularly for structures in the
primary load path, and in mechanisms for
which inadvertent deployment is a hazard.
Eliminate “soft goods” such as cables,
lines, and wires used in structural
applications or retention type applications.
These items raise many questions
regarding structural load path, creep,
thermal effects, integrity of connections,
(for example, knots or crimps) and rigging
procedures for flight.
Eliminate composites in the primary load
path.
Composites include aluminum
honeycomb, metallic structure that is
epoxied or glued together in any way, or
traditional composite materials.
Eliminate items for which safety is highly
dependent upon the build or assembly
process. One example is composites used
in primary load paths. If composites must
be used, professionals, not students,
should do manufacturing.
Also,
setting/rigging of complex safety critical
mechanisms should be done by the
manufacturer.
Design bolted interfaces with redundant
fasteners. Examine use of fasteners in
accordance with NASA fracture control
and
fastener
integrity
documents.
Eliminate single point failure fasteners.
Consider fracture control in accordance
with NASA-STD-5003 from the outset of
design. Ensure that there are no fracturecritical components in the design and that
it is easy to prove that items are nonfracture critical. Examples are design of
structures with redundant load paths, and
structures that are built from wellunderstood, machined metals, with low
stresses.

•

Incorporate pressure relief devices in
high-pressure systems, even when
redundant reducing valves are used.
Incorporate fuses in electrical systems
even if the systems will not be energized
on the Shuttle.

All of the items on this list presented problems in
the UNP program and resulted in cost and
schedule impacts; however, many are not
thoroughly addressed in the NASA safety
requirements. The lesson is that when confronted
with a design that is not specifically addressed in
the safety requirements or is outside of standard
aerospace practice, NASA safety reviewers will
recommend very conservative approaches for
proof of safety. Note that NASA safety reviewers
will not recommend alternative designs if the
design presented results in numerous safety
requirements. They only review and provide
recommendatio ns on what is presented to them.
Therefore, if conservative recommendations
translate into too many requirements and action
items for the payloader’s budget, the burden is on
the payloader to redesign and re-present to NASA.
With this in mind the program management should
have the ability to veto potentially troublesome
designs early or force the designer to choose only
the one or two problematic items that they feel
they can best defend.
Another lesson learned related to design was
implementation of commonality.
Although
commonality is almost always a benefit, it is even
more so when considered in the light of payload
safety. One example concerns the batteries used
in the UNP. The UNP made very little effort from
the beginning to standardize a battery box design
or a cell acceptance test plan even though all of the
nanosats and the MSDS were using Sanyo NiCd
batteries, and the battery design is an area that is
heavily scrutinized by NASA. Therefore, there
were four different battery box designs used in the
program and all participants purchased batteries
from different sources.
This resulted in
development of separate documentation for each
battery because different battery containers had
different safety features. Also cell acceptance
tests differed from one participant to another.
Therefore, it was difficult to present a unified
safety picture to NASA. Battery container and
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battery testing is generally not an area where
anyone should expend resources in innovation and
this should have been recognized earlier.

Table 2. Summary of Lessons Learned:
Design Engineering
Lessons Learned
Work safety and design in parallel to avoid
common pitfalls.
Limit hazard report verification requirements
(tests, analysis, inspections) through design.
Consider the difficulties of proving safety before
committing to a design.
Review designs early using experienced
reviewers. Be familiar with approaches that
make the PSRP uncomfortable.
Eliminate
questionable designs before Phase 0/1 safety.
Implement commonality wherever possible to
limit the variety of safety verifications and
present a unified approach to the PSRP.

Other examples of instances where commonality
did help in the UNP were the purchase of all
fasteners from GSFC to ensure compatibility with
NASA requirements, and standardization on
electrical inhibit relays.
In the future,
standardization could expand to structural buses,
flight computers, and power systems. Students
can still learn a great deal about aerospace
practices by assembling, installing, and testing
standard systems, while maintaining more time
consuming innovative efforts at a manageable
level. Commonality should also apply to programwide software such as CAD systems and analysis
packages.

Configuration Management (CM) and Quality
Assurance (QA)

Other basic design principles take on even more
significance when working with the Shuttle safety
process. These principles are not necessarily
lessons learned but should be considered carefully
especially when working with first-time builders:
•

•

•

One key element that must be treated early in the
program is ensuring that proper hardware
fabrication and building techniques are impressed
upon students. One critical aspect of satellite
construction that students are often unaware of is
QA and CM techniques. QA and CM are
important for both safety and mission success, and
students need to be educated in these areas before
hardware build begins. To an extent this was
something that was done well by the UNP.
Important QA practices were impressed on the
universities early, such as two-person build and
verification, maintenance of certification logs, and
tracking of hardware (fasteners). These practices
were documented by AFRL in a detailed CM and
QA plan, which was passed on to the students and
approved by NASA.

Develop prototypes and engineering
design units. This will give first-time
builders some experience in hands-on
build up and will allow qualification
tests/fit checks to be done.
Early identification of areas where
additional resources are needed, such as
test, safety engineering, software, satellite
fabrication guidance, and analysis
expertise.
Keep satellite designs simple: Design
based on capabilities and experience of the
people who are doing the work.

Lessons learned related to design engineering are
summarized in Table 2.

AFRL also conducted a satellite fabrication
courses and sent experienced representatives to the
universities for configuration management
reviews. Unfortunately, although the CM review
and fabrication course were effective, they were
done too late in the process, after a significant
amount of build-up was completed. The reason
this occurred was most likely poor communication
between the universities and AFRL, wherein
AFRL did not know the universities’ build
schedule. If a representative from AFRL could
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have visited the universities during some of their
early or more critical build up efforts, some
problems with CM documentation may have been
avoided.
Lessons Learned from
summarized in Table 3.

CM

and

QA

AFRL, the delivery took place and the system was
re-tested at AFRL. The stiffness was significantly
higher in the AFRL test with an improved
interface fixture. The lesson learned in this case
was that AFRL could have assisted with reviewing
the university test setup even though the test was
conducted by an outside laboratory. A better
awareness of the university build and test schedule
would have helped with this as well, because
AFRL was not aware of the test until after it
happened.

are

Table 3. Summary of Lessons Learned:
Configuration Management and Quality
Assurance.

Although integration for the UNP generally was
not a problem, a few areas were identified wherein
the government can and should provide early
support.
These areas are development and
operation of lifting hardware considering all
phases of the program, proper design and
operation of ground support equipment, and
construction of hardware shipping containers.
These are subjects that are important but often take
a much lower priority than construction of the
satellite itself. Government integration and test
facilities tend to have personnel with experience
with these matters whereas universities do not.

Lessons Learned
Educate students early in CM and QA. Develop
a program-wide plan for implementing CM and
QA.
Provide direct assistance to students during
hardware build-up to verify students’ knowledge
of basic CM and QA.
Integration and Test
The integration process for UNP, i.e. integration of
the University-built satellites with the AFRL-built
MSDS went very smoothly, primarily because the
interfaces were simple, well-defined, and were
communicated to the universities early with few
subsequent changes.
This allowed easy
configuration changes when some difficulties
arose during testing. One important lesson learned
in the I&T process was related to testing and the
need for experienced personnel to review
university test setups.

Lessons learned related to integration and test are
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Summary of Lessons Learned:
Integration and Test
Lessons Learned
Define interfaces early.
Review university test set-ups, even if they are
performed by professional laboratories.
Provide government support on auxiliary
operations such as lifting, transportation, and
ground operations.

In the UNP program the universities had very little
responsibility for testing, as the final payload was
to be tested in an integrated state after arrival at
AFRL. Most testing conducted at the universities
was for mission success/confidence. However,
there was a requirement imposed by AFRL that
the first mode frequency of the nanosats must be a
certain value or greater, such that the integrated
payload could meet the Shuttle stiffness
requirement. The universities had sine sweep
testing conducted by an outside laboratory that
resulted in a first mode frequency that was
significantly lower than what was expected. When
AFRL reviewed the test data and setup, the test
configuration, specifically the interface to the vibe
table, was immediately suspected. Since at the
time the universities were ready to deliver to

University Lessons Learned
This section focuses on lessons learned that are
particularly relevant to universities’ in house
efforts on the UNP. Some lessons learned are
unique to the universities, and others reflect and
support the program-level issues that have been
discussed so far.
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The process of hardware design and build is a
balance between meeting program requirements
such as safety, mission, and schedule, and
allowing students to be educated through design
and redesign processes. To help ensure success, it
is important to evaluate capabilities and arrive at a
feasible conceptual design early in the program.
Even having arrived at what appears to be a
feasible design, universities should be consistently
evaluating progress and have the ability to descope if necessary. There are many reasons that
even a simple design can become problematic
later, for example, unforeseen safety issues,
requirements creep, or expected resources that do
not materialize. However, the challenges that
arise because of design failures or unexpected
problems, and the need to evaluate and re-design
are part of the education process.

fields must be available to assist. The availability
of government personnel to provide hands-on
assistance is important as well. As the delivery
date for 3CS approached, AFRL did send an
experienced technician to assist with final build on
three occasions. The students indicated that it was
very helpful to have this experienced assistance in
making decisions and moving forward when the
time schedule was getting tight. However, they
also indicated that more visits from qualified
individuals would have been helpful throughout
the program not only for hardware development
but for documentation assistance as well.
As
stated previously , the students found that the
satellite fabrication course offered by AFRL was
helpful, but should have been done sooner. In
general, face-to-face mentoring is required
throughout the program.

In addition to developing feasible designs, which
rely heavily on experience, several additional
design-related strategies can help offset
inexperience. Students found that purchasing
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components
where possible instead of building hardware inhouse played a large part in minimizing CM and
QA requirements. Provided that the product could
meet safety issues (materials, structure etc.), the
QA was provided by the manufacturer and the
manufacturer’s Certificate of Compliance met
most of the CM needs. Building EDUs is also a
helpful strategy both to assure quality and to
educate. For example the EDU will reveal a
design’s strengths and weaknesses and provide the
students with experience in hardware build, even if
elements of the flight unit are eventually
outsourced to a professional manufacturer.
Finally, developing CM and QA document
templates from the outset of the program will help
ensure that documentation is simple and of high
quality, and that common formats are available to
all program participants.

Program management issues for universities focus
on good communication among university
participants, continuity in the workforce, and
subdivision of tasks. Communication within the
university teams is critical particularly when
multiple universities are involved. Students have
indicated that the familiarity obtained from faceto-face meetings with students from other
participating universities allowed work to proceed
more efficiently, and greatly improved teamwork.
In addition, in cases where satellite subsystem
design is assigned to different universities, an
effort should be made to educate all participants in
the design and operation of all systems. This will
greatly aid in component integration and
documentation development. Also subdivision of
the program into smaller tasks, whatever the
program structure, is important to keep students
from being overwhelmed by subjects with which
they are not familiar. Universities should also
establish a common project website to collect and
organize materials such as requirements, designs,
datasheets, etc. so that they may be available to
everyone. Use of such tools as an organized
website, improved teaming through face-to-face
meetings, and good program documentation in
general will not only help the program run
smoothly day-to-day but will help combat issues
of continuity in workforce that arise when students
graduate, move on to other programs, etc.

Because of the complexity and interdisciplinary
nature of spacecraft development, the need for
dedicated, experienced assistance is of great
importance. Both students and professors have
highlighted the importance of qualified mentors,
particularly those that can be present at critical
times. Universities have faculty available in all
engineering disciplines, and personnel from all
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One final important issue is motivation. The best
means of obtaining of obtaining quality work and
maintaining student motivation is simply to pay
the students for their work. Students have also
indicated that major motivators are the ability to
interact with government and industry and thus
obtain experience and training after graduation.
The opportunity to build and fly space hardware is
another motivator.
It is important that all
participants understand the level of motivation of
the student workforce because of the large amount
of work involved in a Shuttle flight and the need to
recognize where assistance is needed.

operation, and capabilities. These topics are
discussed in the next subsections.
Design Assessment
The subject of early design review has been
discussed earlier in the context of avoiding safety
problems. Another more basic area that must be
assessed is the universities’ ability to deliver
innovative hardware whether there are safety
issues or not. On the university side, there is a
need to propose design concepts commensurate
with technical capabilities. In order for the
government to provide input, design review and
evaluation should begin earlier than PDR or Phase
0/1 safety.
Making the review process a
competition between universities may be an
effective tool. For example, rather than evaluating
the designs based solely on the quality and
quantity of science experiments involved, the
ability of the universities to accomplish the
proposed design using a student workforce and
available resources would be evaluated and
factored in the competition as well. Points of
evaluation may be: simplicity of the design,
ability to pass safety, amount of documentation
generated, need for outside special technical
capabilities, and/or ability to stay on schedule and
within budget. Because of the design and safety
issues discussed earlier, it is difficult to produce
hardware that is innovative, low budget, and can
meet the Shuttle requirements. Therefore, the
universities would have to convince the reviewers
that they could accomplish both goals, or face
elimination from the program.

University lessons learned are summarized in
Table 5.
Table 5. Summary of University Lessons
Learned:
Lessons Learned
Assess feasibility of conceptual designs early and
have the flexibility to descope if problems are
encountered late in the design.
Ensure that students have dedicated, experienced
mentors both from the university and
government.
Ensure good communication between university
team members, through face-to-face meetings
and websites.
Subdivide the program into smaller tasks for
students so that they can more easily handle
unfamiliar areas, such as program management
or CM.
Program Management

In addition to simply reviewing design concepts,
another benefit of early evaluation is identification
of areas in which universities may need help. This
can include technical help in such areas as
structural and thermal analysis, hardware build, or
use of test facilities. Other areas that may be
pitfalls are negotiation with other government
agencies that may be involved, (providing the
universities with experimental hardware),
arranging bulk purchases of common equipment,
and assisting with administrative issues such as
International Trade in Arms Restrictions (ITAR).
All of these issues came up in the UNP; some
were dealt with successfully and others were not.
However, once again universities and government

Program management lessons learned are focused
primarily on ensuring success despite university
inexperience and managing government/university
interaction. The most important part of ensuring
success is to have good strategies for university
design assessment. Designs must be reviewed
regularly and efficiently, not only to identify
deficiencies, but also to identify where universities
need outside help before problems begin. Another
important topic is the need to establish a good
government/university interaction in which each
party understands the other’s goals, mode of
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should work together early to anticipate these
items.

graduate.
The lesson learned is that the
government has to have realistic expectations of
student work schedules and the universities have
to communicate a realistic schedule to the
government. For example, if it is not realistic that
work will be accomplished over exam periods or
scheduled vacations, it is better to simply account
for that down time in the schedule.
The
experience from the UNP was that although there
were students working on the program during
vacations, usually some key personnel were not
available. Recognition of these downtimes is a
good way to avoid friction from the outset and will
have a positive effect on morale. Early in the
program, government personnel would view
breaks as times in which the universities could get
caught up on work. This was not always true, for
obvious reasons such as students’ planned
vacations, but also because semester breaks were
often the point at which student turnover occurred
due to graduations and, therefore, new personnel
had to be brought up to speed at those times.

Of course the need to review design items is
continuous throughout the entire project, and this
leads to the need for structured review and
comment cycles. Readiness for design reviews
such as PDR and CDR are often defined in terms
of completeness of documentation, such as
drawings and analysis. In addition, some of the
safety verifications required by NASA were
simply reviews of university documents by AFRL
representatives. A good document review policy
was never established by the UNP; therefore,
many design documents were reviewed after the
fact, i.e. after the hardware was built. This
obviously hindered success in many ways and ties
into the need for better communication. Some
things that must be considered are prioritizing
safety or mission critical review items, generation
and review of procedures with time to incorporate
changes, and using the level of documentation
development as a gauge of program status.

Another important item to take into account
regarding schedule is the inevitable redesigns that
take place due to the difficulty of meeting NASA
safety requirements. The university students were
often designing spacecraft systems for the first
time and most people involved including PI’s had
minimal experience with NASA safety.
As
discussed earlier, one of the lessons learned on the
UNP program is that the government program
management needs to identify and eliminate
designs that are potential safety problems early on.
However, because of inexperience and low budget,
initial student efforts will often incorporate
elements that are outside the scope of standard
aerospace design and may have problems meeting
safety requirements. In these cases the schedule
needs to account for redesigns and the government
should be prepared to provide technical assistance.

University/Government Interaction
The first lessons learned that will be discussed in
this section involve the need for government and
universities to have a common understanding of
basic program issues. These issues are interrelated
and involve communication, scheduling, goals,
and developing reasonable expectations of the
student workforce.
Government engineering
programs are inherently different from those of
universities especially in the case where students
are performing most of the work, i.e. the student
work force is different than a government
contractor. A university in a low-budget, high-risk
situation may not be able to alleviate problems by
adding additional funds or experienced personnel.
Therefore, although the university PI’s should take
responsibility for solving management level
problems, the program will still rely on a student
workforce, and, therefore, all parties must agree on
some limitations that come with that workforce.

Government organizations and universities should
also have a mutual understanding of goals. For
the government, the goal of university programs is
obviously to access and demonstrate universitydeveloped space technology. The program is also
a recruiting and workforce training tool for future
scientists and engineers; a benefit for all. For
universities and students, education and
technology are both goals.
However, the

One of the most basic concepts is the need for the
government and universities to account for
students’ schedules.
Students have other
obligations and priorities such as exams, class
work, and projects, all related to their ability to
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government’s expectation going into the project
should be that student education takes precedence.
For example, documentation, presentations, and
safety items may be prioritized lower than design
and hardware build. This can cause problems
early in the process where most of the deliverable
items consist of documentation. One solution may
simply be more direct support of university
document development by the government.
Another approach is to only allow simple designs
for which the documentation is less complex
(particularly for Shuttle safety) so that the
paperwork can be accomplished reasonably well
by students. In any case the important point is to
combine government experience with the
universities’ ability to conduct advanced research
on a low budget.

Table 6. Summary of Lessons Learned:
Program Management
Lessons Learned
When planning schedules/events, acknowledge
that student schedules vary greatly from industry.
Allow for safety redesigns in program planning.
Government/universities should recognize each
other’s program goals and plan accordingly.
Universities should prove that they have the
capability to deliver hardware.
Identify areas where universities will need
outside support early in the program.
Establish a structured document review process.
Summary
The lessons learned discussed in this paper bring
out some common themes that can be applied to
government/university programs, particularly
those that are Shuttle flights. The lessons illustrate
the need for mutual understanding of program
goals and schedules, the need for early
identification of problem areas especially related
to safety, and identification of areas where
students and universities require government
assistance, both technical and non-technical. With
these concepts in mind, university satellite build
programs can be successful, provided that the
designs are within the capabilities of the students.
The government participants must have sufficient
experience to effectively evaluate university
designs so that success is possible, and so that
costs and schedule remain within limits.
Government and universities also need to
communicate effectively so that the more
experienced government personnel can provide
timely assistance to universities as needed. The
UNP has been a success, considering the initial
lack of experience on the part of most participants.
As a result of the UNP, AFRL has gained a vast
amount of experience in university satellite
programs that it will apply to follow-on efforts.

Good communication between the government
and universities is a common theme in the
previous paragraphs.
The UNP program
employed some successful basic communication
practices such as regular integration telecons with
students, and an FTP site where program
documentation of all types could be exchanged
between AFRL, NASA, and the universities.
There were also some areas that could have been
improved. A better knowledge of university
schedules on the part of AFRL, such as the
hardware build schedule would have been
beneficial to both organizations. In addition,
universities indicated a desire for AFRL to better
indicate the priorities of deliverables such as data,
documents, procedures, etc. so they could improve
resource management.
Program Management
summarized in Table 6.

lessons

learned

are
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